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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
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Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
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In this paper we use Living Standard Measurement Survey (2005) to analyze the effects of remittances on the 
labor participation decisions of the Albanian non-migrants. We apply a micro-econometric two-sector labour 
supply model where the individuals remaining in Albania are allowed to choose among several labour market 
alternatives (non-employment, part time, full time and extra-time) together with the choice of being self-
employed or wage workers. The estimated coefficients of the utility function indicate a positive effect in average 
of the remittances’ receipt on the preferences for leisure for both males and females. However, using the 
estimated coefficients of the utility function to simulate the effect of a percentage increase in remittances on 
hours worked, we find that non-migrant substitute income for leisure only in case they are wage workers while a 
labour incentive effect is observed for the self-employed. The flat tax would make labour behaviour of 
individuals in Albania more neutral versus remittances due to their shift in budget constraint especially in case of 
self employed.  
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  11.  Introduction 
 
Migration and remittances have been increasing in Albania during the last 18 years, generating 
significant welfare gains either for the whole country or for the immigrants themselves.  Remittances 
may affect labour supply by reducing the supply of labour provided by household members who use 
this remittance benefit to buy leisure. This reduction in supplied labour is known in the neo-classical 
labour supply literature as an income effect and is generally not a concern as it represents part of the 
welfare gain from remittances. By contrast, remittances may induce the individuals to supply less 
labour if the migrant conditions the remittance on low household income. Such an effect will reduce 
the welfare gain from remittances by distorting the household labor decisions. Despite, it is 
worthwhile to investigate which of them is prevailing. 
Looking at the overall effect, a rise in remittances reduced labor force participation in Managua, 
Nicaragua but increased self-employment (Funkhouser 1992). Remittances were estimated to reduce 
the participation rates of remaining household’s heads in a number of Caribbean countries although 
the direction of causality was hard to establish (Itzigsohn 1995). Yang (2004) points to more 
encouraging labor supply effects than the standard model when he determined that remittances reduce 
the supply of child labor but increase that of adult labor. Rodriguez et al. (2001) show that migrants 
reduce the labour supply of Philipines non-migrant relatives, and this benefit is generally higher for 
men. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) find that in Mexico, remittance flows only reduce female 
labour supply while male labour supply remains unaffected. The effect of remittances on labour 
supply changes by gender and also by regions.   
As regards the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality, remittances are believed to 
reduce the poverty headcount ratio in Ghana and Bangladesh (Adams 2005) while in Guatemala they 
reduce the depth and severity of poverty (Adams 2004). Wodon et al. (2002) find a decreasing effect 
of remittances in the headcount poverty ratio in Mexico arguing that this is quite comparable with 
government programs targeted in reducing poverty. Despite the negative effect of remittances on 
poverty, their impact on inequality is ambiguous. Nevertheless, analysing the impact of remittances on 
the inequality is not of great importance seeing that remittances are merely non-labour income and not 
related to government policies.   
Many researchers have analyzed peculiar aspects of Albanian migration concentrating mostly 
on the determinants of emigration and remittances. King (2005) depicts the characteristics of the 
Albanian migration with a special focus on the relationship between migration and economic and 
  2social development through financial channels, such as remittances and demographic ones such as the 
migrant selection and return migration. Furthermore, Konica and Filer, 2005 show that remittances 
had an income effect that brought to a reduction in female labour supply. Azzarri et al. find a potential 
disincentive effect on labour effort and participation which may be worried, according to them, as 
“would have implications in terms of missing opportunities for development”. Other studies has dealt 
with the relationship between migration and poverty (Zezza et al., 2005), and on the propensity to 
emigrate (Castaldo et al., 2005). Most of these studies are macroeconomic studies; nevertheless 
migration is an individual choice, thus what this research attempts to do is to fill-in the gap in 
economic studies of migration and remittances at micro level and bringing new insights with respect to 
individual decision on migration labour supply and remittances.  
On the other hand, although these contributions are interesting and useful in easing the 
empirical implementation of theoretical results, they suffer from a possible inconsistency between the 
theoretical model and empirical ways of their implementation. Their limitations are mostly due to the 
negligence of limitations on the choice of hours of work and the participation decisions and hour’s 
decisions not simultaneously accounted, no clear modelling of hour’s decisions or participation 
decisions. Furthermore, despite the fact that a wide strand of economic research has investigated the 
effects of remittances on a variety of topics such as labor supply participation of households composed 
of migrant individuals, there is no a formal analysis of the impact of remittances on labor supply and 
income inequality for Albania.Hence, the aim of this paper is to tackle several questions. Do 
remittances affect the labor participation decisions of emigrant households in Albania?  If yes, what is 
the sign of this affect? Does this effect differ for wage employees and self-employed?  What is the 
impact of remittances on inequality and poverty? In addition, other questions are addressed as regards 
the implementation of a flat tax in Albania. Is the new flat tax more redistributive than the previous 
one in terms of income and welfare? Does the new flat tax result in labour incentives or disincentives? 
How the flat tax would affect the labour supply reaction to remittances? 
In this spirit, we will investigate the microeconomic implications of remittances on the well-
being of individuals by focusing on the labor supply behaviors and income inequality in order to 
conclude on the dependency rate of Albania from the remittance and migration patterns. Secondly, we 
analyze the impact on individual behavior and welfare from reducing the progressivity in the tax 
system replacing the 2007 tax system by a 10 percent flat tax. Third the microeconomic impact on 
labour supply and inequality will be confronted using both tax systems. 
  3We have employed a micro econometric model of labor supply developed by Dagsvik at al. 
(2007) to simulate labor supply responses and welfare of individuals under both tax rules. This is 
called a “two-sector” labour supply model and allows individuals to face choice sets of feasible jobs 
within some sectors, in our case the self employed and dependant employees. In Dagsvik at al. the 
choice of feasible jobs is done within private and public sectors. Nevertheless, in Albania, it is more 
realistic to assume that individuals might rather choose among the self employment or non self-
employment spells rather than working in private or public sectors. In effect, we show that negative 
labour supply responses to remittances shadow stronger and different inter-sectors responses for both 
genders but at diverse magnitudes. Furthermore, this study considers individual labour supply 
behaviours as the insufficiency of data on remittances doesn’t consent focusing on married couples 
whose behaviour is more motivating for policy implications.  
To our knowledge, there are no studies done in the migration field employing a two-sector 
labour supply microeconometric model. The simulation methods might be more promising than 
estimating linear or nonlinear regressions.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section depicts the Albanian migration experience 
and the changes in the fiscal systems. In the section 3, the model is explained briefly. The section 4 
describes the data and the estimation results while the last section concludes. 
 
2.  Description of data and the Tax system in Albania 
 
Aggregate Data 
Until July 2007, the personal income taxation was composed of 5 tax brackets such as below: 
 
Table 1  
Personal Income Tax beforeJuly 2007 
Over (in All)  To (in All)  All  Percentage 
0  14000  0  +1% of the amount over 0 
14000  40000  140  +5% of the amount over 14000 
40000  90000  1440  +10% of the amount over 40000 
90000  200000  6440  +15% of the amount over 90000 
200000  +  22940  +20% of the amount over 200000 
Note: Fact sheet No.7 Taxation, Albinvest 
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Since July 2007, a new tax rule is implemented with the intention of encouraging the 
legalization of the evaded labour, simplifying tax collection and also drawing creates a friendlier 
investment climate ask  foreign direct investment. Considering this new taxation rule, personal income 
are taxed by a flat tax of 10% which results to be one of the lowest tax rates in the world. Income under 
10000 leke will be tax exempted. Albanian government decided to adopt the flat tax following the 
“successful” story of many ex-communist countries such as Estonia, Russia, Rumania, Latvia, Slovakia, 
Ukraine, Georgia, Macedonia and Serbia. Nevertheless, these radical reforms embraced by the above 
countries have been subject neither of ex-ante nor ex-post analysis, (Keen et al.). The advocates of “flat 
tax” dedicate the successful performance of Baltic countries to the simplicity and efficiency of this 
reform without giving any explanation on the Slovenia case which is one of the best “pupils” of the 
Balkan performing successfully without any flat tax.       
Table 2 shows the trend of remittances as a percentage of imports, exports, trade of balance and 
GDP for the period 1996-2005 in Albania. The structural break with reference to the year 1997 was due 
to the collapse of pyramid schemes. After that year, due to the internal and external migration the 
number of Albanian population dropped drastically and especially that male. These large flows of 
migrants have contributed through their remittances significantly to the improvement of the economic 
life of the Albanian households and GDP.    
Table 2 
         1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005
Workers'remittances  500 267 452 368 531 615 632  778  1,028 1,161
Remittances to import (%)  54% 38% 56% 39% 49% 46% 43%  44%  47% 47%
Remittances to TB (%)  74% 50% 75% 56% 65% 60% 55%  58%  65% 64%
Remittances to GDP (%)  15% 11% 16% 11% 14% 15% 14% 13% 14% 14%                    
GDP        3,360 2,375 2,768 3,490 3,709 4,114 4,505  5,859  7,549 8,380
Source: Bank of Albania              
Figures in Millions of USD              
 
LSMS Data 
In this study WE have used the dataset extracted from the Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS), 2005 for Albania. This survey contains information on 3638 
households at a national level covering 17302 individuals and provides individual level and 
  5household level socio-economic data from urban and rural areas in Albania.  The sample was 
designed to be representative of Albania as a whole, Tirana, other urban/rural locations, and the 
three main agro-ecological areas (Coastal, Central, and Mountain). This dataset provides useful 
information as regards main labour supply variables such as hours and disposable income. Also 
data on remittances, migration history of household members, temporary or permanent 
character of migration, illegal or legal feature and the informal or formal money transfer can be 
retrieved. Also data on the social and demographic characteristics as regards especially number 
of children, age and education are generously provided by the dataset. Nevertheless, the 
structure of the households is quite complicated as it incorporates other households. In the same 
time, being household head doesn’t mean being the first breadwinner. In fact for many of these 
composed households, especially in the northern part of the country, the household head 
position is just simply assigned to the oldest member of the household who might be often non 
active anymore in the labour market.   
However, as the main intention of this study is the impact of the remittances on the 
labour participation segregated by sectors (self-employed and wage workers), below we show 
the labour participation rates by gender and sector and their remittances in average. In the 
selected sample, the labour participation rates among women is 55% while among men is 83%.  
Both for men and women operating in the wage employment sector, we notice only one peak at 
the full time alternatives while as  for those working as self-employed, other peaks at part time 
and extra time alternatives are pointed up in addition to the full-time alternative. Looking at the 
average values of remittances across sectors and alternatives, remittances do mainly go to those 
men working full and part time in case of being self employed and full and extra time in case of 
being wage worker. As regards women, the highest share of remittances is received by those 
who don’t work at all succeeded by those who work full time.  
  
Table 3: Distribution of Men and their received average remittances
Hours Interval  Percentage  Self Percentage
Wage 
Worker 
0  17.08%  874 17.08% 874  
1‐16  1.90%  580 0.92% 1650  
18‐33  17.58%  1301 4.23% 8968  
35‐48  37.29%  3024 66.01% 2277  
  649‐64  29.89%  1189 23.37% 1262  
65‐80  13.33%  760 5.46% 703  
All  100.00% (1365) 1824 100.00% (2247) 4622  
         
         
Table 4: Distribution of Women and their received average remittances
Hours Interval  Percentage  Self Percentage
Wage 
worker 
0  44.99%  3522 44.99% 3522  
1‐16  6.84%  1224 1.44% 311  
18‐33  31.60%  1276 3.71% 1341  
35‐48  37.92%  5737 83.85% 595  
49‐64  18.88%  670 10.05% 489  
65‐80  4.76%  1424 0.96% 4318  
All  1345  2857 2620 2634  
Note: 1
st column refers to the labour supply alternatives, the 2
nd and the 4
th columns refer to the 
distribution of individuals across alternatives while the 3
rd and the last column refer to the average 
values of remittances received.  
 
3.  Micro-econometric modelling  
In this paper we employ a microeconometric model of labour supply similar to random 
utility model developed by Dagsvik and Strom (2007). This is a two-sector model of labour supply 
and can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit model where the individuals 
have preferences over sectors and latent job attributes. Only individuals remaining in Albania either in 
couple or singles are considered while the behaviour of other family members is taken as exogenous. 
Let  be the utility function of an individual, where X is his net individual income, h 
is hours of work and z indexes jobs. If   is a set composed of two working sectors, an 
individual faces two wage rates specific for each sector represented by the vector 
.Let  be the set of available jobs with offered hours h. Let   be the 
number of jobs in the choice set   for each sector, and 
) , , ( z h X U
) , 2 1 W W
) ( j B
( W Ω(h) ) (h mj






j j h m θ the total number of 
jobs available in the labour market. Then, 
j
j





is the fraction of feasible jobs with h hours 
in the sector j.   and  { ) 0 ( = } 0 Ω 1 ) 0 ( = m    correspond to the nonmarket alternative.  
For given hours of work and the wage rates, net individual income is given as: 
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where   is a function that transforms gross individual incomes into net incomes. The gross 
incomes are labour income  , capital income and a set of exogenous variables Y . Household 
remittances are included among exogenous variables. A five tax bracket regime is applied to the gross 




In the two-sector framework, the utility function is assumed to have the form of    
  
) ( ) , , ( ) , , , (     ) 2 ( z R h X v z R h X U j j ε κ =   
 
where   is a positive deterministic part which depends on net disposable income, 
working hours h and a dummy variable R (which takes value one if the household receives 
remittances and zero otherwise),  
) (⋅ v
) (z j ε  is a positive random taste shifter which accounts for 
unobserved individual characteristics and unobserved job specific attributes.
4  j κ  represents 
the average taste for working in sector j where j takes the value 1 and 2 referring respectively 
to the sectors of self-employment and wage worker and zero and when   (thus non 
working taste).  
0 = z
 Let  .If the agent chooses the alternative that 
maximizes his utility function, the probability that a given individual chooses sector j and hours 
 is given by: 
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3 The tax rule is applied on yearly gross income which is generated by multiplying the average weekly income 
by 52 (number of weeks per year). In order to simulate potential in-work disposable income for those who are 
observed to be out of work in the data, the hourly earnings equation is estimated after having estimated the 
inverse Mill’s ratio. Considering the high share of evaded labour, the taxes and social security contribution are 
set to zero for all those individuals who declare to not be entitled to social security benefits at main job. 
 







j j j j
j j j j
j h g R Y W h R Y
h g R Y W h
R Y W h P
κ θ
κ θ
) ( ) , , ; ( ) , , 0 ; 0 (
) ( ) , , ; (







j j j j
j h g R Y W h R Y
R Y
R Y P
κ θ ) ( ) , , ; ( ) , , 0 ; 0 (
) , , 0 ; 0 (
) , , 0 ; 0 (     ) 4 (  
 where  , j=1,2 denotes the opportunity density of offered hours in sector j and   ) (h g j j θ , 
j=1,2 represent the availability of jobs in sector j. The equation (4) stands for the probability 
of choosing the non-employment alternative. The preference parameter  j κ cannot be 
separated from  j θ without additional assumptions and in order to achieve identification is set 
to 1.  
 
3.1 Utility function specification  
For the utility function we assume a conventional flexible form, quadratic function which 
represents a second-order Taylor series expansion in income and leisure.  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ; , , (     ) 5 (
2 2 h T R b h T X b h T b X b h T b X b b R h X v R xh hh xx h x − + − + − + + − + =  
    
“b ” represent the utility parameters to be estimated. The “ h T − ” stands for leisure. The last term 
refers to the interaction created between the dummy variable of remittance receipt and leisure. We also 
let the variables capturing individual characteristics be interacted with the main utility arguments 
(income and leisure) as they can’t be estimated alone due to the invariability across alternatives.   
  Individual characteristics are related to age, employment sectors (agriculture, manufacturing 
and public), household position (head, spouse or child), number of children (number of children 0-5 
years, 6-10 years, total number of children), regional dummies (coastal, central, mountain and the 
capital), and urbanization (urban and rural). The remittances are calculated as the sum of the total 
remittances sent in the last year by the migrating children who are either abroad or returned. This sum is 
further indexed to be compatible with the labour earning which are used on a monthly basis and divided 
according to a sharing rule among the individuals in working age within each household. The sharing 
rule is somehow constructed based on the patriarchal feature of the Albanian society so as giving more 
weight to heads and less to children and spouse (1:0.5:0.3 respectively for head, spouse and children). 
  9The conception of head and spouse in this paragraph and through all the estimation and simulation 
procedure doesn’t comply with that used in the original data consenting in this way to all couples to be 
included in the study. In other words, head and spouse refer to head and spouse of sub-households now 
on.      
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The first dummy variable refers to the nonmarket alternative, the next three dummies refer to 
the job opportunities dummies for non self-employed while the last three to self-employed. These 
dummies capture the peaks observed in the distribution of hours in most studies done in several 
countries. They can be interpreted as reflecting quantity constraints on the labour market (as in Aaberge 
et al., 1995, 1999), or specific utility of full-time, part time, extra time jobs, or maybe both (as in Van 
Soest, 1995)
5. 
                    
3.2 Choice set specification and hour’s distribution  
 
The choice set is composed of 11 alternatives for each individual (5 for each sector and one 
for the non-employment spell) by specifying the interval of hours of work and sample randomly 
within this interval which has a length of 16 hours and a maximum of 80 weekly hours. The first 
alternative refers to zero hours of work, the second to 1-16 and so on until the last alternative 64-80. 
As in the first alternative, individuals can choose between out of labour market, unemployment or 
                                                 
5 Van Soest and Das (2001) use a different mechanism to account for "peaks and holes" in observed hour 
distribution, namely fixed cost of working. This leads, however, to a more complicated estimation and therefore I 
would not advise the adoption of this procedure in the basic model estimation.  
  10inactive spells. The actual observed hours will be rounded to the closest discrete value. The basic idea 
can be appropriately modified when one observes directly annual hours or weeks worked. Then, for 
each individual remained in Albania we compute the net income by using the taxation rule applied 
before July 2007 for those who have paid taxes.   
 
3.  Conditional Logit Estimation and Simulation Results 
  In this study, only individuals living in Albania (including also those who have 
returned) and aged from 18 to 65 are selected. We have excluded retired people, students, 
disabled and those in military service. The final dataset is composed of 5973 observation (3010 
males and 2963 females). The coefficients of a conditional logit model are not as easy to be 
intuitively interpreted as a linear model and only the estimated signs might help to understand 
the effect of the variables on the utility function. Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients of 
the conditional logit model both for males and females. The marginal utility of income is 
positive over the whole sample and decreasing either for leisure or income (the negative sign of 
the squared leisure and income). However in order to check for the global concavity character 
of the utility function we have further calculated the first derivative of utility with respect to 
net income. Almost 90% of the sample satisfies the quasi-concavity conditions and this is 
important for the predictive capability of the labour supply model.  
 
  The preference for leisure appears to be higher for females than males probably due to 
their responsibilities towards children and elderly people in the household. The interaction term 
between income and leisure is negative and significant different from zero implying that 
income is not separable from leisure. The preference for leisure significantly decreases with 
age for both males and females but starts increasing after the age of 47. On the other hand, the 
incidence of small children (0-5 years) makes women more leisure disposed which imply that 
their leisure is mainly spent on child caring activities. The presence of children older than 5 
years doesn’t seem to obstacle the participation of women in labour market as they are wholly 
supported by the private or public school. Individuals in the role of head or spouse within the 
households seem to have a higher preference for leisure than the others, thus their children and 
  11other household components, and this might be due to immigrant financial backing. Living in 
the coastal area decreases the preference for leisure than living in Tirana in case of men.  
 
  As regards the dummy of “receiving remittances”, the estimates turned out to be 
significantly positive for both genders. A speculative explanation for this might be that people 
receiving remittances from their children or relatives tend to work less, thus, a clear income 
effect. Then again, the magnitude of the coefficient does not consent to go further into 
conclusions. For that we need to simulate some increase in remittances and analyze its impact 
on labour supply and individual welfare.  
 
Table 5: Conditional Logit Estimates 
Number of observations   3010     2963
LR chi2(43)    4322,56   9445,9
Log likelihood    ‐5056,39  
‐
2391,84
Pseudo R2    0,2994   0,66340
Variables   Male  Female 
  coefficients  t-value   coefficients  t-value  
Job Opportunities          
PPm  ‐2,528839  ‐5,82 ‐2,245628 ‐3,72
Pm  ‐2,147179  ‐8,89 ‐1,796559 ‐5,02
Gm  0,5459453  5,29 1,402569 7,6
PPms  0,6620402  1,37 2,118313 3,33
Pms  0,8372042  3,3 1,34495 3,66
Gms  1,110298  8,33 1,271171 6,1
Self-employed  ‐2,088824  ‐3,83 ‐4,011257 ‐5,22
Wage worker  ‐2,847901  ‐5,22 ‐4,905074 ‐6,38
Leisure & Income          
 l  0,9813131  11,64 1,209491 10,19
l^2  ‐0,004053  ‐10,12 ‐0,005295 ‐9,44
disp  0,1835462  9,88 0,2545068 7,5
disp^2  ‐0,000192  ‐10,66 ‐0,0003432 ‐7,66
l*disp  ‐0,00148  ‐9,16 ‐0,0020707 ‐6,89
Age*l  ‐0,005514  ‐6,66 ‐0,0061298 ‐4,73
Age^2*l  0,0000599  7,05 0,0000716 4,6
Age*l*disp  ‐6,61E‐05  ‐0,63 ‐0,0000904 ‐0,55
Self*l  ‐0,010789  ‐0,82 ‐0,1273794 ‐3,93
Self*disp  0,014267  4,74 0,0150934 1,56
Agriculture*l  ‐0,320888  ‐10,64 ‐0,3619642 ‐7,46
Agriculture*disp  ‐0,089389  ‐9,33 ‐0,147775 ‐7,02
Manifacture*l  ‐0,022898  ‐1,03 ‐0,2001525 ‐6,54
  12Manifacture*disp  0,0007052  0,16 ‐0,0270233 ‐2,99
Public*l  ‐0,012315  ‐0,78 ‐0,0645419 ‐2,74
Public*disp  0,0015936  0,49 0,0112504 1,95
R*l  1,69E‐06  8,08 2,05E‐06 6,38
Head(Spouse)*l  0,0253706  2,02 0,0381336 2,81
Head(spouse)*disp  0,0060658  2,23 0,0066506 1,91
child_0_5*l  ‐0,00171  ‐0,92 0,0146159 4,56
child_6-10*l  ‐0,002464  ‐1,19 0,0031987 1,06
total_child*l  0,0006325  0,57 0,003875 2,18
Coastal*Urban*l  ‐0,035109  ‐1,66 ‐0,0297776 ‐1,29
Coastal*Rural*l  ‐0,060007  ‐2,86 ‐0,0304021 ‐1,03
Coastal*Urban*disp  ‐0,008117  ‐1,97 ‐0,0094674 ‐1,64
Coastal*Rural*disp  ‐0,013046  ‐2,9 ‐0,0161515 ‐1,91
Central*Urban*l  ‐0,048222  ‐2,23 ‐0,0596685 ‐2,31
Central*Rural*l  ‐0,048521  ‐2,18 ‐0,0143224 ‐0,49
Central*Urban*disp  ‐0,013078  ‐2,93 ‐0,0183912 ‐2,81
Central*Rural*disp  ‐0,010063  ‐2,03 ‐0,0103349 ‐1,39
Mountain*Urban*l  ‐0,009323  ‐0,41 ‐0,0661984 ‐2,38
Mountain*Rural*l  ‐0,032602  ‐1,39 ‐0,0173733 ‐0,49
Mountain*Urban*disp  ‐0,005674  ‐1,21 ‐0,0215176 ‐2,93
Mountain*Rural*disp  ‐0,007768  ‐1,37 ‐0,0070331 ‐0,59
Note: “l” stands for leisure, “disp” for disposable income and “R” for the dummy of 
receiving remittances. child_0_5 and child_6_10 stand respectively for the number 
of children from 0 to 5 years and from 6 to 10 years while total_child means the 
total number of children from 0 to 18 years.  
 
Simulation Method and Results 
  We have simulated three different scenarios to capture the effect of remittances under the 
taxation rule until July 2007 (M0) and the new taxation rule after July 2007 (M1). The new flat tax has 
eliminated all tax brackets for all those with income exceeding 10000 leke and also the slight 
progressivity feature. We simulate an increase of remittances by 50% and study labour supply effect 
and three poverty indexes for each selected individual. Furthermore their labour supply elasticity is 
calculated in order to construct a measure which mainly reflects the preferences, individual 
characteristics (education, age, employment sector, and household structure), tax constraints and other 
details related to this period. The selected individuals are disaggregated by remittance deciles where 
higher deciles refer to high remittance receiving individuals. In addition, these simulations account for 
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  Tables 6-7 indicate that an increase of 50% of remittances, other things equal, will affect 
negatively labour supply for both men and women in case they are wage workers while a reverse 
effect is observed in case they are self-employed. The disadvantage effect of remittances on labour 
supply is not something new in the migration literature. Nevertheless, these tables indicate that this 
impact is noticeable only for sizeable amount of remittance share in individual income and especially 
the last remittance deciles. Table 8 indicates that male labour supply is more elastic to remittance 
changes than that of female. If remittances are comparable to non-labour income, this is not something 
new in the literature of labour supply where several studies prove that male labour supply elasticity to 
non-labour income outnumbers female labour supply while the reverse trend is observed in case of 








Deciles   M0  M1  M0 M1
I  32.61348  32.61282  46.6237 46.62381
II  27.55036  27.54493  46.14353 46.14584
III  28.87537  28.85627  47.50375 47.50652
IV  30.19125  30.15541  48.73935 48.75917
V  30.5533  30.50384  47.85358 47.86404
VI  30.36687  30.23003  48.59375 48.58953
VII  28.10178  27.87871  45.12634 45.27331
VIII  29.74043  29.44362  49.85564 50.07621
IX  32.51592  31.89286  46.94759 47.40201











Deciles   M0  M1  M0 M1
 
  14I  11,65535  11,65287  52,29045 52,28836  
II  9,119665  9,105733  43,74645 43,7582  
III  11,87772  11,84187  43,79152 43,83835  
IV  13,89162  13,84811  52,4006 52,45588  
V  10,71529  10,6642  46,76595 46,81461  
VI  11,46077  11,35102  48,09008 48,12782  
VII  12,65334  12,52649  45,80028 46,01454  
VIII  10,26164  9,992486  42,48617 42,84985  
IX  12,0005  11,66052  42,3474 42,59697  






















I  ‐0,0000314  7,82E‐06 ‐0,00042 ‐0,0000535
II  ‐0,0001716  9,63E‐05 ‐0,00347 0,0005524
III  ‐0,0008296  0,000101 ‐0,00614 0,0021702
IV  ‐0,0017062  0,000874 ‐0,00935 0,0024998
V  ‐0,0017316  0,000524 ‐0,01054 0,0022834
VI  ‐0,0069151  7,41E‐05 ‐0,02326 0,0019825
VII  ‐0,0117537  0,006108 ‐0,02386 0,0095027
VIII  ‐0,0136148  0,009086 ‐0,05397 0,0184127
IX  ‐0,0331869  0,020447 ‐0,07046 0,0131285
X  ‐0,1964374  0,179482 ‐0,17188 0,1446428
 
To investigate the potential effect that an increase in remittances would have on the income inequality 
we calculate the GINI coefficient. As regards the measurement of poverty we use the standard poverty 
indexes constructed by Forster, Geer and Thorbecke (1984) and defined as follows: 
 
1.  Head count ratio or poverty rate is simply the ration of the number of people with equivalent 
income below the poverty line. 
2.  Poverty gap is the average deviation of the incomes of the poor from the poverty line relative to 
the total population. It measures the extent of being poor on average.  
  153.  Income gap ratio is the average deviation of the equivalent income of the poor population from 
the poverty line. The product of the income gap ratio and poverty rate results in poverty gap. 
 
Starting from the inequality measures, the Gini coefficient, which is sensitive to income 
changes in the middle of the distribution, does not record any significant change in the income 
distribution. Although an increase in inequality is observed for women in the urban areas. Turning to 
results for the poverty measures, Table 9 shows that the an increase in remittances  would also have a 
small decreasing effect in the incidence of poverty and poverty gap for men while income gap ratio 
(severity of poverty among poor or poverty depth) will increase. In case of women, a reduction in 
poverty rates and gap is noticed only in urban areas while an adverse effect occurs in rural areas. 
However the severity of poverty decreased in both areas.  
This means that the remittances are rather targeted to the poorest females than males. This 
might be due to the way the remittances are distributed inside the family and also the fact that the 
women are the poorest part of the sample. In this case the remittances do really help the poorest of the 
poor. Thus the sharing rule of remittances among the household members is quite important under this 
point of view.  
  
Table 9:Inequality indexes measured on net income 
   Females Headcount 
ratio 
PG IGP Gini 
URBAN M0  32.242 11.21  34.769  0.5085271 
   M1  31.738 10.843 34.163  0.5288993 
RURAL M0  37.238 18.404 49.422  0.643631 
   M1  38.912 19.106 49.099  0.6355637 
            
   Males Headcount 
ratio 
PG IGP Gini 
URBAN M0  24.573 7.732  31.463  0.2513637 
   M1  23.208 7.46  32.143  0.2520159 
RURAL M0  24.111 10.819 44.873  0.2870224 
   M1  22.925 10.65  46.458  0.2931156 
 
 
Simulations replacing the 2007 tax with the 10% flat tax  
 
  Here we present the simulated labour supply responses from replacing the 2007 tax regime by 
a flat tax on personal income. The results (see table 10) show negative labour supply responses for 
high income individuals while those poor appear to work more. Despite the general belief on labour 
  16supply literature, females don’t seem more reactive than males in the labour market. This could be due 
to a high rigidity of working hours faced by women and a lack of part-time possibilities in the 
Albanian labour market. Table 11 shows the average tax rates under both tax regimes decomposed by 
gender. A shift to a flat tax implies a significant decrease in both marginal and average tax rates for the 
high income individuals and especially men. Therefore, the substitution and income effects for these 
individuals have different signs which results in a counteracting effect on labour supply. For the low-
income individuals, the average tax rates slightly decrease while the marginal tax rates probably 
increase, especially for the women of low-income deciles, and therefore their response in the labour 
market is quite ambiguous.  Thus, the flat tax would strongly favour rich individuals than those poor 
and stress gender inequalities. 
  Table 12 reports poverty indicators and Gini index decomposed by gender and area. The 
results demonstrate that the inequality in the disposable income distribution experience minor changes 
while  poverty indicators show a decrease in poverty for men and increase in poverty gap and income 
gap ratio for women in the rural areas due to the high share of women who incur higher average and 
marginal tax rates. This is still enforcing the conclusion drawn by the average tax rates as regards 





  Female    Male  
Income 
deciles  M0  M1  M0  M1
I  0.441402  0.430932  12.42365 13.69209
II  1.290023  1.332835  30.79224 31.7597
III  2.640668  2.775287  34.70658 35.98861
IV  4.25122  4.441697  37.92401 39.14857
V  6.14892  6.313645  36.37957 37.26931
VI  13.54519  13.59267  38.62137 39.29335
VII  24.85409  24.48521  40.24296 39.92196
VIII  29.84352  29.69886  42.58832 41.67186
IX  40.60626  40.62917  45.12472 43.39161








M0  M1  M0  M1
0.129  0.105  0.070  0.075
0.120  0.102  0.098  0.089
0.134  0.106  0.112  0.097
0.141  0.107  0.114  0.098
0.153  0.108  0.122  0.102
0.160  0.108  0.118  0.102
0.164  0.109  0.109  0.099
0.169  0.109  0.128  0.105
0.173  0.109  0.140  0.107
0.176  0.108  0.160  0.108
 
 
Table 12: Inequality indexes measured on net income for women 
        
   Females Headcount  ratio  PG  IGP  Gini 
URBAN M0  36.608  16.262 44.421 0.522668
   M1  36.359  15.756 43.335 0.522642
RURAL M0  42.589  26.663 62.607 0.690769
   M1  42.797  27.402 64.027 0.692901
   Males        
URBAN M0  22.635  7.995 35.322 0.217942
   M1  21.36  7.066 33.082 0.203806
RURAL M0  21.986  8.359 38.021 0.273744
   M1  22.606  7.858 34.758 0.273324
 
 
Simulations replacing the 2007 tax with the 10% flat tax and increasing the remittances by 50%  
 
  Lastly we confront the behavioural and distributional effects of remittances under both tax 
regimes. The tables 13-15 show that under a flat tax regime, an increase in remittances would be 
succeeded in average by an increase of labour supply for men and a decrease for women. 
Decomposing further these labour supply responses by remittances deciles, we find weaker labour 
supply responses to remittances under the flat tax regime than under the previous more progressive tax 
regime. Thus, it seems that flat tax would make labour behaviour of individuals in Albania more 
  18neutral versus remittances. This is quite reasonable as a shift in a flat tax would bring to changes in the 
budget constraint of the receiving remittances individuals. The coincidence of these individuals in the 
high income groups as well, especially those self employed, explains the disincentive labour supply 
effect.   
 
  If we confront the inequality and poverty measures under both tax rules, the income 
distribution and poverty performance don’t change significantly. Only, the situation of men in rural 
areas slightly improves in terms of poverty depth mainly due to their higher participation in the labour 











Deciles   M0  M1  M0 M1
I  11.65535 11.23293  52.29045 50.44348
II  9.119665 8.772886  43.74645 44.44839
III  11.87772 11.43087  43.79152 43.95135
IV  13.89162 13.61986  52.4006 51.99167
V  10.71529 10.62831  46.76595 48.3517
VI  11.46077 11.10523  48.09008 46.97416
VII  12.65334 12.36046  45.80028 45.57098
VIII  10.26164 9.841267  42.48617 42.88543
IX  12.0005 11.48152  42.3474 41.21233



















Deciles   M0  M1  M0 M1
I  32.61348 32.84306  46.6237 48.307
II  27.55036 27.88704  46.14353 47.851
III  28.87537 28.74811  47.50375 47.8994
IV  30.19125 30.09169  48.73935 48.89737
V  30.5533 29.97589  47.85358 49.51893
VI  30.36687 29.75919  48.59375 48.2179
VII  28.10178 27.9736  45.12634 46.09415
VIII  29.74043 29.55699  49.85564 48.87791
IX  32.51592 32.53122  46.94759 46.71379

















I  0.044661  0.075548  ‐0.05747 ‐0.06569
II  0.076492  0.082372  ‐0.02885 0.031899
III  0.043942  0.017219  ‐0.03966 0.005941
IV  0.030215  0.000202  ‐0.02734 ‐0.01407
V  0.004135  0.077861  0.024674 0.068615
VI  0.001057  ‐0.00762  ‐0.00514 ‐0.04735
VII  0.054806  0.04636  ‐0.01525 ‐0.00914
VIII  0.030596  ‐0.03357  ‐0.03458 0.016224
IX  0.034474  ‐0.00021  ‐0.08401 ‐0.05296
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   Females Headcount  ratio  PG  IGP Gini 
URBAN M0  32.242 11.21 34.769 0.5085271
   M1  31.738 10.352 32.618 0.5309474
RURAL M0  37.238 18.404 49.422 0.643631
   M1  39.331 19.427 49.393 0.6348472
            
   Males Headcount  ratio  PG IGP  Gini 
URBAN M0  24.573 7.732 31.463 0.2513637
   M1  20.478 6.488 31.683 0.2340927
RURAL M0  24.111 10.819 44.873 0.2870224
   M1  22.53 10.062 44.662 0.2899156




In this paper we have employed a two-sector labour supply model to simulate the effect of 
remittances on the labour supply and poverty in Albania under two tax regimes. The data used is 
extracted from the LSMS 2005 in Albania. The simulations performed suggest that: 
a)  An increase of 50% of remittances, other things equal, affect negatively labour supply for both 
men and women in case they are wage workers while a reverse effect is observed in case they 
are self-employed. This impact is noticeable only for sizeable amount of remittance share in 
individual income and especially the last remittance deciles.  Male labour supply is more elastic 
to remittance changes than that of female.  
b)  A shift to a flat tax implies a significant decrease in both marginal and the average tax rates for 
the high income individuals and especially men which in turn result in labour disincentives. 
Females don’t seem more reactive than males in the labour market. The flat tax would make 
labour behaviour of individuals in Albania more neutral versus remittances due to their shift in 
budget constraint especially in case of self-employed. 
c)  The Gini coefficient, which is sensitive to income changes in the middle of the distribution, 
does not record any significant change in the income distribution, even though an increase in 
inequality is observed for women in the urban areas. As regards to the poverty measures, an 
increase in remittances would also have a small decreasing effect in the incidence of poverty 
and poverty gap for men while income gap ratio (severity of poverty among poor) will increase. 
In case of women, a reduction in poverty rates and gap is noticed only in urban areas while an 
adverse effect occurs in rural areas. However the severity of poverty decreased in both areas. 
  21This means that the remittances are rather targeted to the poorest females than males. In this 
case the remittances do really help the poorest of the poor.  
d)  If we confront the inequality and poverty measures under both tax rules, the income distribution 
and poverty picture doesn’t change significantly. Only, the state of men in rural areas slightly 
improves in terms of poverty depth mainly due to their higher participation in the labour market. 
Poverty indicators show a decrease in poverty for men and increase in poverty gap and income 
gap ratio for women in the rural areas due to the high share of women who incur higher average 
and marginal tax rates.  
 
Several policy implications are to be drawn from this study. The negative impact that 
remittances may have on the labour supply of wage workers may result in a reduction of 
domestic output and consequently lower tax revenues. Under these circumstances, the 
government would find it optimal to rely either on fiscal instruments such as labor or 
consumption taxation or monetary instruments. On the other hand, the labour incentives that 
remittances might instigate among self-employed should urge policymakers to stick to   
several measures related to the lowering of capital tax rates in order to make investment 
attractive, the lowering of costs of business start-up to facilitate the opening of new 
businesses, the cutting of fiscal costs of financial transfers by allowing the entry of more 
Money Transfer Operators, the enhancing of the efficiency of the banking system, the 
increasing of the reliability of information provided to migrants on the transfer rates, the 
granting of facilities in loans and credit lines to migrants to invest etc. 
To conclude, this paper needs to be replicated in other Balkan countries which are 
highly dependent on remittances (such as Serbia and Kosovo) in order to have a better 
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